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Abstract: The ability to make reasonablefair use of copyrighted material is both economically
and culturally important to the enterprise of education. No otherfeature of copyright laws offers
educators access of the same potentialscope. In assertingfair use, teachers, librarians,and others
cannot rely on a claim of "economic exceptionalism, "for which there is no clear basis in U.S.
copyright law. Nor can they expect to arrive at satisfactoryshared understandings with copyright
owners. Instead, they should seek to take advantage of current trends in copyright case law,
including the marked trend towardpreferringuses that are "transformative,"where the amount of
content used is appropriateto the transformativepurpose. Over twenty years, we have accumulated
considerable information about what constitutes "'transformativeness, " and members of the education community are well positionedto provide persuasive narratives explaining how educational
uses significantly repurpose and add value to the copyrighted content they incorporate.
Keywords: fair use / education / transformativeness

In May 2012, Judge Orinda D. Evans of the federal district court in Atlanta
issued a decision in Cambridge University Press v. Becker' that has been
rightly hailed as a significant recognition of educators' rights to use copyrighted material in their teaching. The publisher plaintiffs, operating with
a significant subvention from the Copyright Clearance Center (the rightsholders' licensing clearinghouse tasked with extracting rents from the
education "market") 2 had sued Georgia State University officials for
infringement in connection with the posting of unlicensed excerpts from
monographs requested by professors on its electronic course reserves system. Eventually the case was narrowed to an individualized consideration
of 74 specific instances, and the judge found that in fully
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use doctrine applied. But the university's victory in Judge Owen's court,
which the publishers now have appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, carries a sting in its tail: In framing her detailed analysis of the
various excerpts, the judge gave significant weight to Georgia State's status
as a "nonprofit educational institution." 3 Beyond that, however, she explained her strong focus on the amount of material copied, measured as
a percentage of the source work, by concluding "that this case involves
only mirror-image, non transformative, uses," a "fact" that "favors market
substitution (thus leaning against fair use), but [that] this tendency is
reduced when the excerpt is small." 4
I'll return in a moment to the merits-or demerits-of this analytic
approach. 5 Judge Owens' decision is only the opening act of a long and
complicated show. As I'll suggest below, the courts have given us little, if
any, specific guidance on how to think about fair use and education, and it
seems unlikely that one district judge's opinion will be the last word. In
fact, this essay concludes that, whatever the result of the Georgia State
case, the education community has some urgent work to do if we really
care about explaining why we sometimes should be allowed to "use"
copyrighted material without getting permission or paying license fees.
But first things first: why, after all, should we care? Educational institutions do have licensing budgets, and an extraordinarily wide range of
material currently is available under license, and more is (presumably)
on the way. Two answers occur to me, one of which was poignantly
suggested some years ago during a conversation about copyright and the
classroom with K- 9 teachers from a number of Philadelphia-area schools.
When asked what difficulties they could foresee if they wanted video about
the 196os civil rights movement for classroom use, teachers from Main Line
schools responded (with quiet self-satisfaction) that they could imagine
none: "We'd ask one of our school librarians, and he would pull a selection
of appropriate clips from one of several licensed video databases." Then an
inner-city elementary teacher raised her hand and spoke from a place of
both anger and resignation: "In my school we have no database licenses, no
librarian; and-for that matter-no library. If I can't bring video I've
purchased or recorded off-air into the classroom, then my kids will have
to do without." It's simple to see that licensing solutions for access to
content assume the means to pay, and that this assumption frequently may
not be borne out in fact.
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The other answer is harder to demonstrate, but arguably wider-reaching
in its implications. It is far from clear that a fully monetized approach to
information use in education will produce the best, or even anything near
the best, learning results. Not only will some users do without, and others
have to make do with material in a database that is not quite what they
would have preferred, given the choice, but in such an environment everyone in and around the educational enterprise will--consciously or unconsciously-begin to monitor and regulate how they acquire and employ
information. Knowledge cannot necessarily be measured out in coffee
spoons, and the "efficiencies" that a ubiquitous market in information is
claimed to promote are not necessarily ones we should desire in and around
the classroom. Put otherwise, the best teaching and learning is a messy and
gloriously inefficient enterprise, in which dozens of information objects
may need to be sampled (and discarded) before the right one for the
purpose can be identified. Or the heuristic value of a wide-ranging search
may, in the end, outweigh the importance of any object finally retrieved.
In any event, one thing should be clear: educators who want to go on
making their own decisions about what materials to teach (whether from or
to), and who care about their students having a similar range of choices,
have work to do in developing an account of how their current practices fit
into the grid of legal analysis with which Congress and the courts have
provided us. I'll argue below, more specifically, that the courts have done
use-communities (including education) a tremendous favor by reimaging
the law of fair use in terms of the "transformativeness" standard 6 ; that
educators need to reciprocate by describing how their socially and culturally valuable activities relate affirmatively to that standard; and that this
isn't, in fact, very difficult work for anyone who has ever written a syllabus
or a lesson plan.
It's important to acknowledge, however, that the Copyright Act includes exceptions other than fair use, including some specifically (and
rather narrowly) designed to address the needs of education itself, and
others that speak to the ability of academic and school libraries to support
education. One possible response to the challenge that copyright poses for
educational practice would be to ask Congress for more of the same,
inviting lawmakers to carve out new, robust exceptions for things like
online course reserves, the appropriation of text and video in classroom
remix projects, or the incorporation of content into the footnotes (or other
35
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apparatus) of term papers, theses, and dissertations-all activities that, like
many others, receive no specific warrant under U.S. law. This approach,
I'd humbly suggest, is a nonstarter. There is absolutely no indication that
educators could lobby Congress to expand their specified use rights under
copyright (let alone those of their students), especially in an environment
where rightsholders in general appear to have taken a pledge not to support
any new exceptions to copyright, no matter how well justified.7
Another approach would be for educators to try, once again, to negotiate guidelines around acceptable educational uses of copyrighted materials with publishers, movie studies, music publishers, recording companies,
professional photographers, and all the other communities of rightsholders
who assert copyright control over material of educational value. Perhaps
the best that can be said for this approach is that it has been tried, and the
results have not been pretty. Negotiated guidelines tend (when they can be
agreed upon at all) to be strict, narrow, and more focused on metrics
than on the nature of the educational enterprise; worse still, rightsholders
have shown an irrepressible tendency to interpret guidelines that were
designed to create "safe harbors" for users as outer limits on permissible
8

use.
So in the end, educators don't have any good choices here-except to
try to make the fair use doctrine as it stands work better for teachers and
students today and tomorrow. That said, there are different approaches to
accomplishing this, one of which might be dubbed "educational exceptionalism"-the notion that teaching and learning are so special, and so highly
favored in copyright policy and fair use law, that it ought to be possible to
get courts to cut education some special slack, beyond that which they
extend to uses of third-party copyright material by filmmakers or musicians
or publishers.9 After all, say advocates of the exceptionalist approach to
educational fair use, mainstream education is, along with all its other
sympathetic characteristics, a quintessentially noncommercial activity
(undertaken without a profit motive and generally operating in the red).
That, too, counts for something in fair use analysis-or should.
But there's the rub. There's little if any evidence for the proposition that
education actually enjoys (as distinct from being morally entitled to enjoy)
a preferential position in the array of positive human activities that, from
time to time, may lay claim to special treatment under copyright law. True
enough, the very first case decided under the legal rubric of fair use, back in
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(in a loose sense) education-related--a conflict between dueling
biographies of George Washington but what's sometimes lost is that
although in Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Joseph Story announced and applied
the new doctrine, he concluded that a later-coming popularizer had no
defense against a claim of infringement by an earlier and more long-winded
biographer.'" Even so, Story's decision could have been the beginning of
a string of fair use cases investigating the application of the doctrine to
education and cognate practices. But as things turned out, it was nota circumstance the reasons for which I will speculate upon a bit further
1841, was

along in this essay.
Notably, educational use does not even figure as a privileged use category in Alan Latman's comprehensive review of the case law up to 196o.11
In fact, the closer twentieth-century U.S. copyright case law got to general
educational practice (though it never has gotten all that close), the less
encouraging the results appear to be. In 1914, a court considered Macmillan
Co. v. King, 12 involving an economics tutor who had prepared study sheets
that borrowed content from a popular college textbook. Although there
had been no showing of economic harm to the author, the court declined to
excuse the activity, even though it was educational in nature:
I am unable to believe that the defendant's use of the outlines is any the less
infringement of the copyright because he is a teacher, because he uses them
in teaching the contents of the book, because he might lecture upon the
contents of the book without infringing, or because his pupils might have
13
taken their own notes of his lectures without infringing.
In other words, some educational activities may be noninfringing uses, but
educators don't necessarily get a general pass. The point is underlined in
a more recent case, Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks
(1978), where a public school system had created a cooperative project
to record educational TV programs off the air and make a library of them
available to instructors. That, the court ruled, was not clearly a fair use: "I
find that the substantiality of the copying and the possible impact on the
market for education films tip the balance in favor of the plaintiffs, outweighing [the school system's] noncommercial, educational purpose in
copying the films."' 4 Neither of these decisions addresses what we might
think of as "core" educational use-that is, the use of copyrighted material
in or around the classroom, or (as it is these days) on class-related websites.
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Here the trail goes cold; these decisions are about all the directly relevant
case law there was, 15 at least until Georgia State.
Nor does Latman's survey of historical attempts at copyright revision
reveal any Congressional interest (sustained or otherwise) in the topic.
A look at the prodigious legislative history of the 1976 Act doesn't suggest
that the Congress had educational fair use on its mind at that time-with
the single exception being that educational photocopying was presented as
a threat to publishers' interests; indeed, it was this concern that was primarily responsible for the codification of the fair use doctrine, in its present
form, in Section 107 of that Act. This helps explain why the reference to
education in the the Section's preamble reads as follows: "[T]he fair use of
a copyright work.., for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copiesfor classroom use), scholarship or
16
research, is not an infringement of copyright."'
So what does this suggest? Two radically different stories can be fitted
to this thin body of evidence. In the more optimistic one, the dearth of
attention to educational fair use from relevant lawmakers is explained by
the fact that education's highly privileged position in the universe of fair
use is simply too clear ever to have required additional legislative attention
or attracted much in the way of court challenges; in other words, copyright
owners have long tolerated the unlicensed use of copyrighted material by
educators precisely because they have no real choice. In the other account,
the explanation is simply that-at least until quite recently-educational
uses haven't generally been a source of particular, sustained concern to
copyright owners (although when they were, as in the case of photocopying, the legal system responded). We may hope that the former accountin effect, a negative assertion of educational exceptionalism-is the truer of
the two, though sustaining it requires various assumptions and leaps of
faith, Georgia State notwithstanding. But we must prepare for the possibility that the latter may be closer to the mark.
If the cultural premises of educational exceptionalism are shaky, so are
its economic foundations, even (or especially) after Georgia State. The fact
that a use is for "nonprofit educational" purposes does carry some weight
in fair use analysis; indeed, Section 107(1) says as much, indicating that an
inquiry into the "purpose and character of [a given] use" can be informed
by "whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes"-although courts have not told us much about exactly
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why or how this works. We do know that, in general, "noncommercial"
uses are treated with special solicitude. But the fact that educational activities may be conducted without a profit motive does not necessarily make
them "noncommercial" in the sense that that term occurs in copyright
discourse; as an influential 1984 decision put it, the "distinction is not
whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user
stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price."7 Self-evidently, private schools and most
institutions of higher education charge tuition and fees-to say nothing of
selling course materials. Perhaps even more to the point, all schools are
a "market" for ever-increasing kinds and numbers of firms trading in
knowledge goods. Educators' choices about what to buy or license, and
what to use without payment, obviously can affect these businesses' bottom
line.' 8 This problem is only likely to increase as new business models for
19
selling copyrighted material to schools proliferate.
The challenge that these developments present for conventional fair use
analysis is well illustrated by a 1995 case from outside the domain of
education, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.2" The big oil com-

pany had made a practice of photocopying articles from academic journals
to which it subscribed when requested by any of its 400 to 5oo staff
scientists, and when a publisher objected, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals ultimately found that the practice was not fair use. Two considerations helped to produce this decision. One was that the practice was deemed
not to be meaningfully transformative: "Texaco's photocopying merely
transforms the material object embodying the intangible article that is the
copyrighted original work."'" The other was the existence of a "workable
market" system for licensing the rights to make such photocopies (through
the Copyright Clearance Center). In the absence of a finding of transformativeness, the fourth factor in fair use analysis, which looks to potential market
harm from the use, dominated the court's analysis and dictated its result.
If educational uses are subject to the same analysis, the proliferation of
business models for licensing content to the education community will
increasingly undermine fair use arguments. Notably, the Texaco case was
an important point of reference for Judge Owens in Georgia State:
This Court agrees .. that where excerpts are reasonably available, at
a reasonable price, it is only fair for this fact to be considered in determining
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whether Defendants' unpaid uses of excerpts constitutes a fair use. Fair use
is an equitable doctrine. For loss of potential license revenue to cut against
fair use, the evidence must show that licenses for excerpts of the works at
issue are easily accessible, reasonably priced, and that they offer excerpts in
22
a format which is reasonably convenient for users.
In many instances, the absence of proof that functioning licensing systems
were in place for particular monograph excerpts helped to sway Judge
Owens toward finding fair use. 23 But where she concluded that a challenged
use was not fair, the state of the licensing market also played a significant
part. On her way to concluding that a use of a chapter from C. Wright
Mills' The Power Elite on the electronic reserves system constituted
infringement, she put it this way:
Plaintiffs produced evidence demonstrating that there was a ready market
for licensed digital excerpts of this work in 2009 through [the Copyright
Clearance Center]. The unpaid use of the excerpt by Professor Harvey and
her students caused very small, but actual, damage to the value of Oxford's
copyright. In addition, widespread use of similar unlicensed excerpts could
cause substantial harm. Oxford lost permissions income. Factor four
24
strongly favors Plaintiffs.
The problem that such analysis poses for teachers and schools is obvious.
In this half-hearted vision of educational exceptionalism, fair use is a likely
casualty of innovations in licensing practice. So what is to be done? One
possibility, of course, is to persuade the courts (including, given the importance of the issue, the Supreme Court) to take educational exceptionalism
more seriously, making clear that serious teaching and learning enterprises
deserve a special presumption of validity all their own in fair use analysis,
entailing some insulation against factually grounded arguments that unlicensed use means a loss of licensing revenue to rightsholders. 25 Taking
a risk on this kind of doctrinal innovation, I'd suggest, is a long shot at
best. Not only are "test cases" in copyright law difficult to frame, but in
general they ultimately are decided using novel applications of clear existing law. Educators' best chance, then, is to catch a ride on the train that is
already moving-the clear trend toward transformativeness analysis.
Courts considering whether a particular challenged use is fair (rather
than infringing), are directed in Section 107 to consider, among other
things, four factors (derived, in turn, from pre-1976 judicial opinions):

40
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the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
(i)

copyrighted work.
In recent decisions, moreover, federal courts (up to and including the
Supreme Court) have indicated that a critical consideration in evaluating
most (if not all) of these factors is whether the use can be considered
..transformative"-whether it "adds something new, with a further purpose or different character ... ."' If that is the case, the first factor can
weigh in favor of fair use even if the use is "commercial" in character. Selfevidently, the second factor tends to favor transformative uses as well,
precisely because they add value to the preexisting material rather than
merely repeating it for its original purpose. Moreover, if the use is transformative, courts will approve the use of a greater proportion of the
protected material in connection with the third factor. Finally, and crucially, if a use is a transformative one, it is likely to satisfy the fourth factor
as well, because (as the federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently
has recognized) copyright owners are not entitled to control the "transformative markets" for their works.
For an introduction to how fair use works today, it is instructive to
examine the exceptionally detailed 2oo6 Second Circuit decision in Bill
Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.27 In that case, the defendant
published what the court described as a
48o-page coffee table book [that] tells the story of the Grateful Dead along
a timeline running continuously through the book, chronologically combining over 2000 images representing dates in the Grateful Dead's history
with explanatory text. A typical page of the book features a collage of
images, text, and graphic art designed to simultaneously capture the eye
28
and inform the reader.
The plaintiff owned the copyrights to posters and other graphic materials
associated with the musical group's historic appearances at Bay Area
venues such as the Fillmore Auditorium. After a negotiation to establish
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license terms for the use of these materials in the book broke down, the
publisher proceeded to use seven of them without authorization, and the
lawsuit followed.
The court's analysis began with the "purpose and character" of the use,
emphasizing the "transformative" way in which the publisher deployed the
images; the judges agreed with the trial court that the "use of images placed
in chronological order on a timeline is transformatively different from the
mere expressive use of images on concert posters or tickets. Because the
works are displayed to commemorate historic events, arranged in a creative
fashion, and displayed in significantly reduced form,.. . the first fair use
factor weighs heavily in favor of DK."29 In other words, the recontextualization and repurposing of the quoted material made all the difference.
The "nature of the copyrighted work," which often favors copyright
plaintiffs, was judged here to be inconclusive; although the posters were
creative works, the use focused on their value as historical artifacts. The
"amount and substantiality" of the portion used also was deemed a toss-up,
since to accomplish its transformative purpose, "DK displayed reduced
versions of the original images and intermingled these visuals with text
and original graphic art. As a consequence, even though the copyrighted
images are copied in their entirety, the visual impact of their artistic
' 30
expression is significantly limited because of their reduced size."
The result was sealed by the fact that a consideration of the "effect. . . upon the market" tilted conclusively for the defendant. How, it is reasonable to ask, could that have been the case when licensing the use of the
images in question (and others like them) was an established part of the
plaintiffs core business? The answer: "DK's use of BGA's images is
transformatively different from their original expressive purpose [and]
[i]n a case such as this, a copyright holder cannot prevent others from
entering fair use markets merely by developing or licensing a market for
parody, news reporting, educational or other transformative uses of its own
creative work... . [C]opyright owners may not preempt exploitation of
transformative markets ...."31 In other words, transformativeness
trumped the obvious evidence of economic harm in the form of lost
32
licensing fees.
In considering how this general analytic approach might be localized to
the educational context, several observations are in order. To begin, it is
clear that the transformative use rationale applies with full force to uses that
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repurpose copyrighted material without creating new protected works.
Section 107 exists to promote socially beneficial uses of protected content,
but benefit can come in many forms, and in fair use analysis courts value
33
the "highly transformative" contributions made by new indexing tools
and research databases 34 as much as those made by parodies or scholarly
commentaries. According to Judge Harold Baer Jr. of the New York
federal district court, "The use of digital copies to facilitate access for
print-disabled persons is also transformative." 35 Recently, an opinion of
the General Counsel of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office concluded
that the practice by which applicants and patent examiners illustrate
arguments about "prior art"-by exchanging unauthorized copies of
journal articles-was a transformative fair use, notwithstanding the
36
existence of an established licensing market for such reproductions.
In contemporary copyright law, a teacher who provides students with
excerpts from copyrighted material to illustrate a lesson or provoke class
discussion has fair use rights, just as does a textbook author (or academic
critic).
That said, not all fair use claims based on transformativeness are necessarily of the same weight or value. Just as courts recognize some uses as
"highly" transformative, they label others as "less" so.37 In the latter
instances, economic considerations such as the user's profit motive or the
owner's lost licensing revenues may loom larger than would otherwise be
the case.31 It would be irresponsible to suggest that the case law so far
points clearly to the emergence of a sliding scale, as such, in tranformativeness analysis. But just as there is no bright line between transformative
and nontransformative secondary uses, 39 there is no obvious demarcation
dividing more and less transformative ones. It follows that educators must
be prepared to give not merely a good account of their activities, but the
best account possible.
Clearly, courts engaged in determining how transformative a use may
be are moved by the stories that users tell about their goals and purposes.
For example, in 2006, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Blanch
v. Koons, which concerned the artist-defendant's incorporation of a portion
of an image known as "Silk Sandals," which had earned the fashion
photographer-plaintiff a $750 commissioning fee, into "Niagara," a painting in the widely exhibited seven-painting "Easyfun-Ethereal" series commissioned by Deutsche Bank for $2 million. Judge Sacks's opinion quotes
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Jeff Koons's explanation of his creative rationale for the use at length, 40 and
then defers broadly to this account of the artist's creative process:
"Although it seems clear enough to us that Koons's use of a slick fashion
photograph enables him to satirize life as it appears when seen through the
prism of slick fashion photography, we need not depend on our own poorly
41
honed artistic sensibilities."
What stories could educators tell about the transformative nature of
their activities? Suppose, for example, that an instructor posted a number
of individual songs from the 195os and early i96os as "assigned listening"
on the class website for a course in Mid-Century American Popular Music,
and referenced them (some in detail and some in passing) in lectures or
class discussion? The use in question is profoundly different from that for
which the music selections originally were composed or commercialized:
there the objective was entertainment, and here (by contrast) it is learning.
In effect the course itself, and the individual class sessions of which it is
(in part) made up, do the work of recontextualizing and adding value to the
music. Moreover, without using these (or other) copyrighted selections, it
would be difficult to accomplish the instructor's teaching goals effectively.
And, of course, it is unlikely that an excerpt of less than the two- to threeminute duration of the typical pop song would have been equally appropriate to those pedagogical objectives.
Shifting to the K-12 environment, consider a teacher who wants to
introduce students to the ways in which mass media manipulate audience
responses, and chooses to launch this lesson by providing the class with
DVD copies of selected video clips. This material is being used not for
the purpose of selling alcohol or personal care products but to illuminate
the invisible processes by which commercial tastes are formed. Without the
class component that is to come, students might or might not make the
connections; without the illustrations, however, they would be less likely to
benefit from the lesson. Or, to bring the discussion full circle, imagine an
electronic reserves system on which, at the request of the instructor in
a course on Trends in Central European Political History, a college library
posted articles and book chapters illustrating historiographical trends in
writing about the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These are scholarly
writings being used in an academic setting, but whereas they were originally produced to provide authoritative specialist accounts of various features of the Dual Monarchy, they are being employed here for another,

Jaszi . Fair Use and Education

independently valuable educational purpose: to display the ways in which
42
thinking and writing about the subject have changed over time.
These may be neither the best examples nor the best explanations of
them. Ultimately, educators will be the best narrators of their own practices
and motives. But one thing is sure: the characterization of educational
practices for fair use purposes is too important a topic to be left to judges
alone. Nor should the question of how and why educational practices
constitute fair use be left until the moment of litigation. Educators should
recognize that: (i) they must rely on fair use for the accomplishment of
their missions; (2) they cannot depend on educational exceptionalism; and
(3) the turn of copyright doctrine toward transformativeness analysis presents them with an extraordinary opportunity. Who better than educators
themselves to take this opportunity-to recount how instructional uses of
copyrighted materials add value to, repurpose, and indeed transform such
materials? It is time we started telling those stories.

i

Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker (aka Georgia State), 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga 2012).

-. See infra note 18.
3. Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1225 ("Because the facts of this case so clearly meet the
criteria of () the preamble to fair use factor one, (2) factor one itself, and because (3) Georgia State
is a nonprofit educational institution, factor one strongly favors Defendants.").
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pp. 1224 of her decision, Judge Evans notes that:
Plaintiffs strongly advocate that the nontransformative nature of the excerpts (mirror images of parts of
the books) means that the first fair use factor must favor Plaintiffs. While Supreme Court decisions in
other factual contexts have emphasized the importance of the transformative nature of the use in
applying th[e first] factor, in Campbell, the Supreme Court said the following in discussing the first
fair use factor: "The obvious statutory exception to this focus on transformative uses is the straight
reproduction of multiple copies for classroom distribution." (citing Campbellv. Acuff-Rose, 5io U.S. $69
(1994). at 579n.i)
For a further discussion of this somewhat cryptic dictum, suggesting that Judge Owens' reliance
on it may be misplaced, see infra note 15.
5. It may be worth noting here the obvious limitations of an approach to educational fair use that
depends so heavily on percentages. Even in the context of excerpts from scholarly monographsthe only one considered by Judge Owens-a rule of thumb that requires special justification for
copying that exceeds to percent of the original with suspicion may be overly restrictive in practice.
And it is difficult to see what benefit this approach might yield teachers who are interested in
posting photographs in connection with an art history or offering popular songs as objects of study
for a music class, let alone film studies teachers who want to stream entire films to their students.
See, e.g., Ass'n for Info. Media & Equip.
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(copyright claims dismissed on grounds that streaming was

authorized by contact and that copying of physical media to enable streaming constituted fair use).
6. For more about transfomativeness, see Pamela Samuelson, "Unbundling Fair Uses," 77 Fordham
Law Review 2537

(2009);

and Michael J. Madison, "A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use,"

45 William & Mary Law Review 1525 (2004). See also Campbell, 5io U.S., in which the United
States Supreme Court adopted this analytical approach.
7. The so-called TEACH Act of 2oo2, codified in Section 11o(2) of the Copyright Act, illustrates the
problem. This attempt to update the Section ito exemption for classroom teaching to reach
distance education was ultimately so burdened with exceptions and qualifications to be of dubious
utility to its intended beneficiaries. See Kenneth D. Crews, "Copyright Law and Distance
Education: Overview of the TEACH Act" (Aug. I7, 20o), at http://copyright.columbia.edu/
copyright/files/201o/o8/teach-act-summary-by-kenneth-crews.pdf

(accessed December 2o1).

Efforts to update the library exemptions of Section to8 to take account of (among other things)
changes in information technology have been unsuccessful to date. See "The Section io8 Study
Group Report: An Independent Report sponsored by the United States Copyright Office and the
National Digital Information Infrastructure and Preservation Program of the Library of
Congress" (March 2oo8), at http://www.sectionio8.gov/docs/Secio8StudyGroupReport.pdf
(accessed December 2012). Legislative efforts to bring about a compromise solution to the problem
of "orphan works" (i.e., those presumptively protected by copyright but lacking identifiable
owners) have been snagged on hidden obstructions in political waters; the most progress such
legislation has made, to date, has been the passage (by the Senate only) of the Shawn Bentley
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